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Abstract
Although the ratio of higher educated lifetime earnings relative to primary-educated lifetime
earnings (skill premium) is higher in poor than rich countries, poor countries have a sub-
stantially lower fraction of individuals with higher education (skilled individuals). Why? In
a sample of 52 countries, we document that the unemployment rate of the skilled net of that
of the unskilled decreases with a country’s level of development. We argue that the cost of
opening and operating a business is a first order determinant of these unemployment rates
and can reconcile a lower skill acquisition in front of a higher skill premium in poor compared
to rich countries. To formalize our argument, we write and quantify a matching model of
endogenous occupational choice and skill acquisition. A country’s business cost, schooling
cost and skill-productivity profile determine its fraction of skilled individuals, skill premium
and unemployment rates by skill level. We infer a higher business cost for poor countries
and, via counterfactual experiments, find that disparities in the business cost account for
about one third of the cross-country correlation between skill premium and fraction of skilled
individuals.
JEL: E24, I24, J31.
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1 Introduction
Cross-country data on wages and schooling indicate that although poor countries have higher
skill premia than rich countries, the fraction of skilled individuals is substantially lower in
poor countries. For example, between 2000 and 2010, a 1% increase in income per worker is
associated with an increase of 0.07 percentage points in the fraction of men with secondary
and tertiary schooling (“skilled” individuals) and with a 0.44 percentage-point decrease in
the ratio of tertiary- and secondary-educated lifetime earnings relative to primary-educated
lifetime earnings (“skill premium”).1 This negative cross-country correlation is surprising
as one would expect the higher incentives associated with a higher skill premium to boost
the fraction of skilled individuals in poor countries. By now, the literature has put forward
various explanations based on supply side factors (fewer high education institutions in poor
counties), credit constraints, and factors relating to wage determination. In this paper, we
study the role of the cost of opening and running a business (“business cost”).
Our focus on the business cost for rationalizing the negative cross-country correlation be-
tween skill premium and acquisition is motivated by two observations we report on the cross-
country patterns of unemployment rates. Using the World Development Indicator dataset
provided by the World Bank, we construct conditional unemployment rates for skilled and
unskilled men in a sample of 52 countries over the period 2000-2010. We find that, first,
skilled individuals face a higher risk of unemployment in poor countries compared to rich
countries. The cross-country correlation between the conditional unemployment rate of
skilled workers and the logarithm of income per worker is -0.36. Second, the unemployment
rate of unskilled workers shows no consistent cross-country correlation with the logarithm
of income per worker.2 Combining these two observations, Figure 1 shows the conditional
unemployment rate of skilled workers net of that of unskilled workers (“unemployment dif-
ferential”). A 1% increase in income per capita decreases the unemployment differential by
1Details are in Figures 6a and 6b in the Appendix. Many in the literature report cross-country patterns
in skill composition and skill premia similar to ours (see, among others, Caselli, 2005, and Ferna´ndez, Guner,
and Knowles, 2005). Moreover, in our sample, comparable cross-country trends in skill composition emerge
for different definitions of skill. Figure 8 in the Appendix shows skill composition across countries when
skilled individuals are defined as male individuals with tertiary schooling and unskilled individuals are their
complement.
2Figure 7 in the Appendix plots skilled and unskilled unemployment against the logarithm of income
per capita while Table 7 summarizes the cross-country correlations of unemployment rates by skill level,
fraction of skill individuals and skill premium. Similar cross-country patterns of unemployment of skilled
and unskilled individuals emerge for the alternative definition of skilled individuals as tertiary-educated men
and of unskilled individuals as the complement (see Figure 9 and Table 8 in the Appendix).
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Figure 1: Unemployment differential. For each country, conditional unemployment rates are measured
between year 2000 and year 2010 for male individuals and calculated as averages during these years. Source:
the World Bank.
0.02 percentage points. Ceteris paribus, the higher unemployment differential in poor coun-
tries can potentially reconcile the lower fraction of skilled workers despite the higher skill
premia as it decreases the incentives to acquire skills in poor countries by both decreasing the
expected returns and increasing the riskiness of such investment. In light of this evidence, we
study cross-country skill acquisition within a framework that encompasses what we consider
being a first-order determinant of the unemployment rate: the business cost.34
A substantial body of literature in macroeconomics and development attempts to understand
cross-country disparities in skill acquisition, based at least in part on the tight link of a coun-
try’s skill composition with its human capital and aggregate productivity. Schooling cost
and individuals’ lifetime productivities have been identified as important drivers (see, among
others, Bils and Klenow, 2000). We develop a simple matching model of occupational choice
and skill acquisition in which business cost, along with schooling cost and skill-productivity
profile, endogenously determine the fraction of skilled individuals, skill premium and unem-
ployment rates by skill level in a country. We use our model to quantify the significance
of disparities in business cost along with schooling cost and skill-productivity profile in ex-
3Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia, and Pissarides (2001) report a negative correlation between start-up business
costs and employment levels across major OECD economies. They are also the first to show that, in a stan-
dard equilibrium search framework with endogenous occupational choice, business start-up costs discourage
entrepreneurs and increase the number of workers, giving rise to monotonic relation between start-up costs
and employment.
4We acknowledge that other potential explanations, such as country-specific networks related to economic
inequality and country-specific idiosyncratic business risk (Michelacci and Schivardi, 2013), can be important
for employment levels and deserve a quantitative assessment. However, we abstract from these potential
alternative explanations in this article.
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plaining skill acquisition and skill premium across countries. We infer a higher business cost
in poor countries and find that disparities in such cost accounts for about one third of the
cross-country negative correlation between skill premium and skill acquisition.
We write a matching model of endogenous occupational choice and skill acquisition. Ex-ante
identical individuals can improve their skill and/or become an entrepreneur by incurring,
respectively, a schooling and a business cost. Workers and entrepreneurs randomly and
anonymously match in the labour market to produce output (a match productivity) in rela-
tion to both their skills. Given match productivities, schooling and business costs determine
the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled workers and entrepreneurs. The business cost
influences the fraction of skilled individuals in relation to the shape of the skill-match pro-
ductivity profile and the extent of risk aversion. Under risk neutrality, a higher business cost
decreases the fraction of skilled entrepreneurs and increases the fraction of skilled workers
asymmetrically so that the overall fraction of skilled individuals decreases when the slope of
skill-match productivity profile is higher for workers than it is for entrepreneurs. Our model
has independent interest as it describes, simultaneously, occupational choice, skill acquisi-
tion and unemployment outcomes. Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia, and Pissarides (2001), within the
equilibrium search literature, come closest by endogenizing sorting between entrepreneurs
and workers through heterogeneity in entrepreneurial ability that does affect the output of
a match. Differently, we endogenize a facet of heterogeneity via a skill acquisition decision
that induces heterogeneity on both workers and entrepreneurs.5 This allows us to describe
the equilibrium effects of costs related to the acquisition of skills.
We implement a quantitative experiment to assess the role of business cost for skill acquisition
and skill premium across countries. We allow countries to differ by their schooling cost,
business cost and match productivities. These country-specific parameters are calibrated so
that the model implied fraction of skilled individuals, unemployment differential and skill
premium are as close as possible to replicating these same moments observed in each country
in our sample. The calibrated model fits the targets well and is also in line with the cross-
country variations in the conditional unemployment rate of skilled and unskilled workers,
which were not targets of the calibration exercise.
Consistently with anecdotal evidence provided by the World Bank and the study of Djankov,
Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) on regulatory costs of entry to business, we infer a
5Up to the skill acquisition decision, our model is a static version of Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia, and Pissarides
(2001)’s framework under a degenerate distribution of entrepreneurial ability.
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higher business cost for poor countries compared to rich countries. The cross-country corre-
lation between the calibrated business cost and the observed logarithm of GDP per worker
is -0.48. At the same time, poor countries calibrate lower schooling costs and higher pro-
ductivities of matches where at least one party between the worker and the entrepreneur is
skilled (“skilled matches”). In our framework, cross-country disparities in match productiv-
ities can be linked to disparities in the bias toward skill of the production technology as well
as in individuals’ productivities. The positive correlation between productivities of skilled
matches and a country’s level of development that we calibrate is therefore consistent with
Caselli and Coleman (2006) who, for a cross-section of 52 countries in the late 1980s, find
that the bias toward skill of the production technology increases with a country’s GDP per
worker and with the development literature measuring a higher quality of the educational
system in rich countries (see, among others, Caselli, 2005).
We use our calibrated model to run a decomposition exercise where we shut down, one at the
time, cross-country disparities in schooling cost, business cost and match productivities. We
find that disparities in the business cost and match productivities explain, for the most, the
negative cross-country correlation between skill premium and skill acquisitions, whereas the
model still produces a negative cross-country correlation between skill premium and fraction
of skilled individuals with no cross-country differences in the cost of schooling. Disparities
in the business cost account for about one third of the cross-country correlation between
skill premium and fraction of skilled individuals. Decreasing the business cost to US-levels
would decrease the gap in the skill premium between countries in the top-half and bottom-
half of the income distribution in our sample of 78% and entirely eliminate the gap in skill
acquisition. A lower business cost increases the expected returns to acquiring skill as it
depresses the conditional unemployment rate of skilled workers in poor countries of about 2
percentage points and turns the unemployment differential from positive to negative.6
Our paper relates to the literature in macroeconomics and development addressing disparities
in skill acquisition and skill premium across countries. It complements this literature by
analyzing the role of business cost in a model that is consistent with cross-country patters of
unemployment rates by skill level along with skill premium and skill acquisition. Prominent
papers, such as Restuccia and Vandenbroucke (2014), focus on the role of productivity and
6The business cost, as a determinant of the economic environment in which firms operate, has been
found relevant in explaining various cross-country economic outcomes. The seminal paper of Hall and Jones
(1999) shows that countries with good social infrastructures have high human capital and output per worker.
Studies on cross-country market regulations include, among others, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), Botero,
Djankov, Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) and Fang and Rogerson (2011).
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life expectancy for skill acquisition but do not consider the effect of unemployment and its
determinants. By simultaneously considering cross-country patterns of skill acquisition and
skill premium, we show that this additional dimension is indeed relevant. Studies on the skill
premium mainly focus on time series rends and identify the key role of skill-biased technical
change for the rise of the skill premium in both rich (see, among others, Acemoglu, 2002,
Goldin and Katz, 2008, and Krusell, Ohanian, Ros-Rull, and Violante, 2000) and in poor
countries (Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel, 2013). Consistent with this literature, our paper
accommodates the possibility of different biases of technology toward skill across countries via
country- and skill-specific match productivities. However, we focus on cross-sectional data
and take match productivities as exogenous with the aim of measuring their importance for
cross-country patterns of the skill premium in comparison to that of schooling and business
cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 cali-
brates the model and details the results of the quantitative experiment. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a matching model of occupational choice and skill acquisition. There are con-
tinuum of individuals of measure one. Individuals are ex ante identical and live for one
period. They are endowed with y0 units of goods and one unit of time. Individuals take
two decisions simultaneously: (i) skill acquisition decision as to whether to incur a schooling
cost sc to acquire additional skill, and (ii) occupational decision as to whether to incur a
business cost c to run a business. If the schooling cost is incurred, the individual gains the
status of “skilled”, (s), otherwise he remains “unskilled”. If the business cost is incurred,
the individual acquires the status of an “entrepreneur” – that is, a firm’s owner/manager
(f), otherwise he remains a “worker”. Entrepreneurs manage firms and create jobs (one per
firm); workers occupy jobs to make them productive. Individuals take their skill acquisition
and occupational decisions on the basis of their expected payoffs. These two decisions give
rise to a set of four individual types, T = {t : sf, sw, uf, uw } in the unit interval: (a) skilled
entrepreneur (sf), incurring costs c and sc, (b) skilled worker (sw), incurring cost sc, (c)
unskilled entrepreneur (uf), incurring cost c, and (d) (uw) unskilled worker.
After the skill acquisition and occupational decisions are made, all individuals enter the
6
labour market. Entrepreneurs and workers meet randomly and anonymously.7 A non-
negative output yij ∈ {yuu, ysu, yus, yss} is produced when an entrepreneur with skill status
(i ∈ {sf, uf}) meets a worker with a skill status j ∈ {sw, uw}. For notational simplicity we
drop the f and w from the subscript of output and denote the skill level of the entrepreneur
(worker) in the first (second) subscript. We assume that the matching of an unskilled en-
trepreneur (uf) with unskilled worker (uw) produces zero output i.e. yuu = 0.
8 A firm’s
output is split between the worker and the entrepreneur: the latter pays the former a wage
(wij) determined via Nash bargaining. Workers with non-productive matches are deemed
unemployed since their labour is unused. Entrepreneur are always engaged since their labor
is used up to open the firm.
Let pjw be the mass of individuals who choose to be workers with skill j and pif the mass
of mass of individuals who choose to be entrepreneur with skill i. They describe the skill
and occupational distribution of individuals, which is determined in equilibrium and will be
discussed later. Then a firm matches with a skilled worker with probability psw and with an
unskilled worker with probability puw. With the complementarity probability 1− psw − puw
the firm remains vacant. Analogously, a worker matches with a skilled firm with probability
psf and with an unskilled firm with probability puf . With probability 1−psf−puf the worker
remains unemployed. After matching, production takes place.
We now turn to the expected payoff of the individuals of all four types from various matches.
Let Φ(·) be a strictly concave utility function with the standard regularity conditions. An
entrepreneur’s value of the match is represented by the following utility matrix:
Entrepreneur
Matched with unskilled (uf) skilled (sf)
unskilled worker (uw) Juu = Φ (y0 − c) Jsu = Φ (ysu − wsu + y0 − c− sc)
skilled worker (sw) Jus = Φ (yus − wus + y0 − c) Jss = Φ (yss − wss + y0 − c− sc)
unmatched (vacant) Vu = Φ (y0 − c) Vs = Φ (y0 − c− sc)
The term wij in the matrix indicates the wage of a worker of skill j employed in a firm with
7 The assumption of anonymous and random matching implicitly defines a matching function. Given
market tightness θ, defined as the ratio of workers to entrepreneurs in the labour market, the number of
matches in the labour market equals Ω× 11+θ , where Ω is the number of entrepreneurs in the labour market.
This matching function respects the constant returns to scale assumption typical of the search literature (see
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
8Setting yuu to zero implies that we implicitly assume the output of an unskill-unskill match equals the
wage of an unemployed worker and the profits of a vacant firm.
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an entrepreneur of skill i, for i, j ∈ {s, u}. Notice that as we assumed that yuu equals zero,
the maximum wage an unskilled entrepreneur is willing to pay an unskilled worker is zero.
As the worker is willing to accept only positive wages, the value of a match with an unskilled
worker for an unskilled entrepreneur is identical to that of a vacant firm, i.e. Juu = Vu. The
expected utility of an entrepreneur given his skill is:
Ju = pswJus + (1− psw)Vu, (1)
Js = pswJss + puwJsu + (1− psw − puw)Vs. (2)
Similarly, a worker’s value of matching with an entrepreneur is represented by the following
utility matrix:
Worker
Matched with unskilled (uw) skilled (sw)
unskilled entrepreneur (uf) Euu = Φ (y0) Eus = Φ (wus − sc+ y0)
skilled entrepreneur (sf) Esu = Φ (wsu + y0) Ess = Φ (wss − sc+ y0)
unmatched (unemployed) Uu = Φ (y0) Us = Φ (y0 − sc)
The expected utility of a worker given his skill is:
Wu = psfEsu + (1− psf )Uu, (3)
Ws = psfEss + pufEus + (1− psf − puf )Us, (4)
such that psw + puw + psf + puf = 1.
The total surplus of a match, Jij + Eij − Vi − Uj, is divided between the worker and the
entrepreneur. We assume the wage is determined via Nash bargaining between the worker
and the entrepreneur (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999):
wss = arg max
[
(Jss − Vs)θ(Ess − Us)1−θ
]
,
wus = arg max
[
(Jus − Vu)θ(Eus − Uu)1−θ
]
,
wsu = arg max
[
(Jsu − Vs)θ(Esu − Uu)1−θ
]
,
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameters that measures the entrepreneur’s bargaining power.
Equilibrium. In equilibrium, each individual optimally chooses its skill acquisition and
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occupation to maximize his expected utility of a match given the distribution of choices
of other individuals. We only focus on an interior equilibrium where a non-degenerate
probability distribution of other individuals, p = {puf , psf , psw, puw}, exists within the set of
probability distributions P such that no agent has any incentive to deviate from his chosen
option.
Formally, such an equilibrium is a vector {p, wuu, wsu, wus, wuu} that satisfies the following
restrictions.
1. Given {p, wuu, wsu, wus, wuu}, each individual chooses the best response option as fol-
lows:
(a) choose sf if Js ≥ max(Ju,Ws,Wu)
(b) choose sw if Ws ≥ max(Ju, Js,Wu)
(c) choose uf if Ju ≥ max(Ws, Js,Wu)
(d) choose uw if Wu ≥ max(Ws, Js, Ju).
Therefore individuals have no incentives to deviate from their chosen option if the
following value matching condition holds:
Js = Ju = Ws = Wu.
2. Wages, wij, are determined by Nash bargaining as shown in eq. 5.
The equilibrium distribution of skill acquisition and occupational choices p is a fixed point
within the set of probability distributions P . Since individuals are non-atomistic, only
individuals with zero measure can deviate in equilibrium. Note that the game is symmetric
and therefore by Mas-Colell (1984) (Theorem 2) the equilibrium exists. Such an interior
equilibrium is unique. We characterize the exact solution when individuals are risk neutral
in Appendix A.1.
Discussion. The focus of our paper is on the determinants of skill acquisition, skill premium
and unemployment rates by skill level. In the following, we consider the response of these
three variables to changes in the cost of business.9
9We report the comparative statics of the schooling cost with respect to skill acquisition, skill premium
and unemployment rates by skill level in Appendix A.1.
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We start by defining skill acquisition, skill premium and unemployment rates by skill level
in the contest of our model. Skill acquisition is given by the fraction of skilled individuals.
As the population has total measure of one, the proportion of skilled individuals, ps, is the
sum of skilled workers and skilled entrepreneurs:
ps = psw + psf . (5)
We compute the skill premium as the average earnings of skilled individuals relative to that
of unskilled individuals:
skp =
Es
Eu
, (6)
where
Es =
(yss − wss) psfpsw + (ysu − wsu) psfpuw + wuspswpuf + wsspsfpsw
psw(psf + puf ) + psf
,
Eu =
pufpsw(yus − wus) + puwpsfwsu
puw(psf + puf ) + puf
.
The numerator of the first (second) equation is the sum of the earnings of (un-) skilled
individuals weighted by the relevant match probabilities, while the denominator is the pro-
portion of employed (un-) skilled individuals. The earnings of a worker are his wage while
the earnings of an entrepreneur are the firm’s profit flow, y−w. Last, the unemployment rate
of (un) skilled individual, us (uu), is the proportion of skilled workers that are not matched
with a firm:
us =
psw(1− puf − psf )
psw + psf
, (7)
uu =
puw(1− puf − psf )
puw + puf
. (8)
Recall that entrepreneurs are always employed in our model as they spend their time man-
aging and opening the firm independently of whether a worker is hired or not.
Next, we solve for the interior equilibrium of our model under risk neutrality (a linear utility
function) and study the comparative statics of the endogenous moments of interest in eqs.
5, 6, 7 and 8 with respect to the business cost. The assumption of risk neutrality allows us
to solve for the equilibrium in closed form solution. Equilibrium wages are linear in output:
wij = (1 − θ)yij. We report the equilibrium probabilities, p, in Appendix A.1 to simplify
the technical details of the derivation. A higher business increases the proportion of skilled
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workers and decreases the proportion of skilled entrepreneurs:
∂ps
∂c
=
1
yus︸︷︷︸
∂psw
∂c
− 1
ysu︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂psf
∂c
.
Whether the fraction of skilled individuals increases or decreases with the cost of business
depends on the relative slopes of the skill-match productivity profiles faced by workers and
entrepreneurs. The match productivity pair for a worker goes from (yuu, ysu) to (yus, yss)
when he becomes skilled, whereas that of an entrepreneur goes from (yuu, yus) to (ysu, yss).
These changes in the match productivity pair are a component of the returns to skill acqui-
sition as the productivity of a match is proportionally split between the entrepreneur and
the worker. When yus is greater than ysu, the slope of the skill-match productivity profile
of workers is steeper than that of entrepreneurs and the latter have lower returns to skill
acquisition than the former. In this case then, an increase in the cost of business decreases
the fraction of skilled entrepreneurs more than it rises the fraction of skilled workers, there-
fore decreasing the fraction of skilled individuals altogether – that is, when yus > ysu then
∂ps
∂c
< 0.
Turning to the skill premium and the unemployment rates, we calculate the local comparative
statics in the neighborhood of c = 0 and sc = 0 assuming θ = 0.5 to simplify the derivations.
The local derivative of the skill premium with respect to the business cost reads:
∂skp
∂c
|c=0,sc=0 = 4(−yss + ysu + yus)
2(y2us − y2su)
ysuyus(ysu + yus − 2yss)(ysu + 2yus)2 .
Two things are important to point out. First, when the productivities of the intermediate
matches (su and us) are equal, the business cost does not have an effect on both the skill
premium and the fraction of skilled individuals under risk neutrality. Second, if countries
only differ in their business cost, the model produces a negative cross-country correlation
between skill premium and fraction of skilled individuals when the output of the skilled-
skilled match (yss) is lower than the average outputs of the intermediate matches (su and
us):
∂ps
∂c
/
∂skp
∂c
< 0, for:
yus + ysu
2
> yss.
The restriction of yus+ysu
2
> yss tells of a degree of complementarity between skilled and
unskilled individuals in production. Under this restriction, and turning to the unemployment
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rates, we can show that the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled workers increase with
the business cost.10 When ps decreases with the cost of business – that is, when yus > ysu,
the model generates a negative correlation between the unemployment rates and the fraction
of skilled individuals in a world where countries only differ in their business cost:
∂ps
∂c
/
∂uu
∂c
< 0,
∂ps
∂c
/
∂us
∂c
< 0, for: yus > ysu.
Most importantly, the model can generate a negative correlation between the unemployment
differential and the fraction of skilled individuals in a world where countries only differ by
their business cost:
∂ps
∂c
/
∂us − uu
∂c
< 0, for:
yus + ysu
2
<
√
yss
√
yus.
It can be shown that if yus > yss and ysu is “small enough”, the set of (yss, yus, ysu) that
satisfies conditions yus+ysu
2
<
√
yss
√
yus and
yus+ysu
2
> yss is not empty.
11 That is, there exist
combinations of match productivities for which the model generates a negative correlation
between the fraction of skilled individuals and the unemployment differential as well as a
negative correlation between the fraction of skilled individuals and the skill premium in a
world where countries only differ by their business cost.
As it transpires from these simple comparative statics, our model is flexible enough to ac-
commodate alternative scenarios through which the business cost influences our endogenous
variables skill premium, skill attainment and unemployment rates by skill level.
10This result holds under the lighter restriction of yus + ysu > yss. This same restriction also guarantees
a negative response of the fraction of skilled individuals to increases in the schooling cost, i.e. ∂ps∂sc < 0 (see
Appendix A.1). For completeness, we report the derivatives of the unemployment rates by skill level:
∂uu
∂c
|c=0,sc=0 = − (yss − ysu − yus) (ysu + 3yus)
yus (ysu + yus) 2
,
∂us
∂c
|c=0,sc=0 = − (yss − yus) (ysu + yus − yss) (−4yss + 3ysu + yus)
ysuyus (−2yss + ysu + yus) 2 ,
∂(us − uu)
∂c
|c=0,sc=0 = (ysu − yus)(−yss + ysu + yus)
2((ysu + yus)
2 − 4yssyus)
ysuyus(ysu + yus)2(ysu + yus − 2yss)2 .
11The restriction of a “small enough” ysu requires: ysu ∈
(
0,max
{
0 , yus
(
2( yssyus )
1
2 − 1
)})
.
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3 Quantitative Experiment
We run a quantitative experiment with the objective of understanding the main drivers
of the negative cross-country correlation between skill acquisition and skill premium. We
focus in particular on the importance of factors influencing the demand side of the market
for skilled workers (business costs) in determining skill acquisition and skill premium. Our
quantitative strategy consists of three steps. First, we calibrate cross-country disparities
in schooling cost, cost of business and match productivities to cross-country disparities in:
1) fraction of skilled individuals, 2) skill premium, and 3) unemployment rate differential
between skilled and unskilled workers. Second and to check the merit of the model, we
explore the model implications for cross-country disparities in the unemployment rates of
skilled and unskilled workers. Third, we measure the importance of business cost, schooling
cost and match productivities for skill acquisition and expected returns to such investment
via multiple decomposition exercises in which we counterfactually shut down cross-country
disparities in each of these three exogenous factors.
Based on data availability, we consider a sample of 33 countries at different stages of develop-
ment: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Great Britain, Canada, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Check Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay, United States, Venezuela. For each country, we observe:
1) fraction of skilled individuals, 2) skill premium, and 3) unemployment rate by worker’s
skill. All data except for the skill premium are measured between year 2000 and year 2010
and calculated as average during these years (Source: WDI dataset provided by the World
Bank). The skill premium is measured between year 1992 and year 1998 (Source: Ferna´ndez,
Guner, and Knowles, 2005).
3.1 Simulation set-up
Strategy. We let the countries differ from one another on three dimensions:
• cost of doing business, c,
• schooling cost, sc,
13
Parameter Symbol Value
Workers’ share in bargaining θ 0.4
Curvature of the utility function γ 1.035
Initial endowment y0 1
Table 1: Calibration: parameters chosen without solving the model.
• productivity of worker-firm match by skill, yss, ysu, and yus.
We set a number of parameters a-priori and calibrate the remaining within the model. The
parameters that we calibrate without solving the model are reported in Table 1 together with
the assigned values. We set the entrepreneur’s share in bargaining, θ, to 40%.12 We assume
individual preferences are represented by a CRRA utility function and set its curvature, γ,
to 1.035. The curvature measures the willingness of an individual to endure variability in
his consumption stream: the higher the γ, the less variability the individual wants in his
consumption stream. The microeconomics literature suggests that γ must be approximately
equal to 1 (the logarithmic utility case; see, among others, the early works of Arrow, 1971,
Kydland and Prescott, 1982, and Kehoe, 1983). Last, we normalize y0 to 1.
The list of remaining parameters that are calibrated within the model is:
Λ = {cj, scj, yss,j, yus,j, ysu,j}
where the index j indicates a country. Given that we have 33 countries in our sample, we
calibrate a total of 5x33=165 parameters. The calibration targets are the following statistics
for each country:
• fraction of skilled individuals: number of secondary- and tertiary-educated males di-
vided by number of primary educated males,
• skill premium: ratio of tertiary- and secondary-educated lifetime earnings relative to
primary-educated lifetime earnings,
• unemployment rate differential: logarithm of the unemployment odds for skilled work-
ers net of that for unskilled workers.
12The performance of our calibration exercise changes only slightly when we set the share parameter to
50%: the average percentage explained of our data targets by the model decreases from 99% to 95%.
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Correlations of Observed log(GDP per worker)
and:
c -0.480 (0.047)
sc 0.348 (0.047)
yss 0.321 (0.068)
ysu -0.111 (0.538)
yus 0.300 (0.089)
average y 0.334 (0.058)
Table 2: Calibration: statistics on calibrated parameters. P-values are in parenthesis. Source: the
World Bank for cross-country data on GDP per worker and own computations.
There are a total of 3x33=99 targets.
Formally, the calibration strategy consists of minimizing the following equation:
min
Λj
3∑
u=1
(
xu,j(Λj)− x˜u,j
x˜u,j
)2
.
For a given Λj, we compute the model moments, xu,j(Λ), that correspond to the targets
described above, x˜u,j. The model is solved numerically. We simulate the model separately
for each of the 33 countries in our calibration exercise. Even though the parameter values
are chosen simultaneously to match the data targets, each parameter has a first-order effect
on some targets. Match productivities for which at least one party is skilled, {yss, ysu, yus},
are key to match the data on the skill premium . The cost of doing business in a country, c,
is important for matching the unemployment rate differential in that country. Comparative
statics on our model under the risk neutrality assumption show that the unemployment rate
differential responds to changes in the cost of doing business (see Section 2). Given a value
for y and c, the schooling cost in a country, sc, is parameterized so that the model implied
fraction of skilled individuals is as close as possible to replicating the fraction of skilled
individuals observed in that country.
The values of calibrated parameters are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Table 3 reports the
cross-country correlations of the values of calibrated parameters with observed GDP per
worker. The calibrated cost of business is lower in richer countries: the correlation between
the calibrated c and the observed logarithm of GDP per worker is -0.48 (Table 3, first
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Figure 2: Calibration: implied cost of doing business and schooling cost.
row). This finding is supported by anecdotal evidence on measured cost of doing business.
The World Bank publishes a ranking of 189 countries based on how conducive to business
operations their regulatory environments are, with first place being the best. Panel (a) of
Figure 4 shows a significant negative correlation of a country’s ranking and the logarithm of
GDP per worker.
We calibrate a cost of schooling that is higher for richer countries: the correlation between
the calibrated sc and the observed logarithm of GDP per worker is 0.35 (Table 3, second
row). Foregone earnings are a sizable component of the schooling cost of higher education.
For example, for individuals born between 1920 and 1980 in the US, foregone earnings while
attending college are, on average, at least twice as high as college fees and tuitions (see Figure
10 in the Appendix). Panel (b) of Figure 4 reports a positive correlation of 0.875 between
the wages of low-skill individuals and the GDP per worker in a 191 sample of countries.
Lastly, on average, richer countries calibrate higher mach productivities for matches where
the worker is skilled and the average productivity of matches where at least one of the two
parties is skilled tends to increase with the logarithm of observed GDP per worker (correlation
of 0.33, see Table 3, rows 3 to 6). In Appendix A.1 we show that, in our framework, cross-
country disparities in match productivities originate from cross-country disparities in the
bias toward skill of the production technology as well as in individuals’ productivities. In
particular, higher bias toward skill of the production technology and higher productivity
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Figure 3: Calibration: implied match productivities.
of skilled individuals relative to that of unskilled individuals, due for example to higher
schooling quality, feeds into the model via higher mach productivities for matches where
at least one of the two parties between the worker and the firm is skilled. The calibrated
cross-country pattern of our match productivities are therefore consistent with Caselli and
Coleman (2006) who, for a cross-section of 52 countries in the late 1980s, find that the
bias toward skill of the production technology increases with a country’s income level and
with the development literature claiming a higher quality of the educational system in rich
countries than poor countries (see, among others, Caselli, 2005).
The model’s performance on targets is shown in Figure 5. On average, the model explains
99% and 98% of, respectively, the skill premium and the fraction of skilled individuals in
17
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1  1.1
log GDP per worker (US=1)
10 
40 
70 
100
130
160
190
ea
se
 o
f d
oi
ng
 b
us
in
es
s
ARG
AUS
AUTBEL
BOL
BWA
BRA
GBR
CAN
CHL
CHN
COL
CRI
CIV
CYP
CZE
DNK
DOM
ECU
SLV
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRCGTM
HUN
IND
IDN
IRL
ISR
ITA
JAM
KEN
LUX
MYS
MEX
MAR
NLD
NIC
NOR
PAK
PAN
PRY
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
SGP
SVK ESP
KOR
SWE
CHE
TZA
THA
URY
USA
VEN
(a)
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
log of GDP per worker (US=1)
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
lo
g 
of
 p
er
-h
ou
r w
ag
es
 in
 lo
w
-s
ki
ll 
oc
cu
pa
tio
ns
ARG
AUS
AUT
AZE
BEL
BGD
BGR
BHR
BHS
BLR
BRA
BRN
BWA
CAN
CHL
CHNCIV
CRI
CYP
CZE
DEU
DNK
FINGBR
GHA
HKG
HUN
IDN
IND
ISL
ITA
JOR
JPN
KAZ
KGZ
KHM
KOR
KWT
LTU
LUX
LVA
MAC
MDA
MDG
MDV
MEX
MUS
MWI
NOR
PAK
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
RUS
SGP
SLV
SVK
THA
TUR
USA
VCT
VEN
ZMB
ZWE
(b)
Figure 4: Anecdotal evidence on cost of doing business and cost of schooling across countries.
Panel A plots the ease of doing business as published by the World Bank. This ranks economies from 1
to 189, with first place being the best. A high ranking (a low numerical rank) means that the regulatory
environment is conducive to business operation. The index averages the country’s percentile rankings on 10
topics covered in the World Bank’s Doing Business. The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the
percentile rankings on its component indicators. Source: the World Bank. Panel B plots average per-hour
wages in low-skill occupations. Low skill occupations are: service workers and shop and market sales (code 5
for 1-digit ISCO88 coding), plant and machine operators and assembler (code 8 for 1-digit ISCO88 coding)
and elementary occupations (code 9 for 1-digit ISCO88 coding). Source: Occupations around the World
dataset and Penn-World Table dataset.
a country. Moreover, the squared correlation between model and data moments is 99.8%
for the skill premium and 95.4% for the fraction of skilled individuals. The model fit on
the unemployment rate differential by skill sees a squared correlation between model and
data moments of 99.8% and the model matching on average 98.9% of the unemployment
rate differential by skill in each country. To further check the fit of the model, the first
two rows of Table 3 report the correlations between the logarithm of observed GDP per
worker and targeted moments for both the observed data and the simulated model. After
calibration, the model-generated fraction of skilled individuals and skill premium show a
correlation with the logarithm of observed GDP per worker equal to, respectively, 0.515 and
-0.704. The straight difference in the unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled workers
is negatively correlated with the logarithm of observed GDP per worker in the model as it
is in the data. However, the model correlation is not significant. Overall and consistently
with the data, the model produces a negative correlation between the fraction of skilled
individuals and the skill premium. This correlation is -0.642 in the model and -0.599 in
the data, both statistically different from zero. In poor countries, despite the lower cost of
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Correlations Data Model
between observed log(GDP) per worker and:
% skilled 0.508 (0.002) 0.515 (0.002)
skill premium -0.701 (0.000) -0.704 (0.000)
unemployment skilled minus unemployment unskilled -0.422 (0.014) -0.169 (0.346)
unemployment skilled -0.428 (0.013) -0.489 (0.004)
unemployment unskilled 0.196 (0.273) -0.298 (0.092)
between % of skilled individuals and:
skill premium -0.599 (0.001) -0.642 (0.000)
Table 3: Calibration: model fit. In parenthesis are p-values. The correlations for the logarithm of
observed GDP per worker and data moments differ from those reported in Table 7 as in the quantitative
exercise we focus on a sub-sample of the dataset presented in the introduction and used in Table 7. Source:
the World Bank and Ferna´ndez, Guner, and Knowles (2005) and own computations.
schooling, individuals face low match productivities for skilled matches and higher cost of
business, both of which decrease the returns to skill acquisition. Countries in the bottom-half
of the income distribution have an average business cost of -4.3, compared to the average
business cost of countries in the top-half of the income distribution of -8.8 and to that of the
US of -7.8. The average match productivity for countries in the bottom-half of the income
distribution is about 3/4 that for the US and for countries in the top-half of the income
distribution.
We assess the merit of the model based on moments that are not targets of the calibration
exercise: cross-country variations in the unemployment rate of skilled and unskilled work-
ers. Table 3, rows 5 and 6, reports the cross-country correlations of these unemployment
rates with the logarithm of observed GDP per worker. The negative correlation between
the logarithm of observed GDP per worker and the unemployment rate of skilled workers
generated by the model is very closed to the corresponding correlation in the data: this
correlation is -0.428 in the data and -0.489 in the model. The cross-country correlation of
the unemployment rate of unskilled workers and the logarithm of observed GDP per worker
is 0.196 in the data. The same correlation computed on the model-implied unemployment
rate of unskilled workers is -0.298. However, both correlations are not statistically different
from zero at 95% confidence level.
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Figure 5: Calibration: model fit.
3.2 Decomposition Analysis
How much of the cross-country variation in skill acquisition and observed returns to such
investment are explained by business cost, schooling cost and match productivities? Coun-
tries in the bottom half of the income distribution have a fraction of skill individuals 21
percentage points lower than that observed in the US and, at the same time, they record a
skill premium which is 1.4 times that in the US. How? To answer these two questions we run
two decomposition exercises, each of them is described, respectively, under “Cross-country
analysis” and “Poor vs rich countries analysis”.
Cross-country analysis. How much correlation between skill acquisition and skill premium
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would we observe if all countries had the same a) schooling cost, b) business cost, c) match
productivities? To address this question we conduct a decomposition exercise consisting
of three counterfactual experiments. In each counterfactual experiment we assign to each
country the sample averages of, respectively, the cost of doing business (“No c variation”), the
schooling cost (“No sc variation”) and the match productivities for which at least one of the
two parties is skilled (“No y variation”). For each counterfactual experiment, we measure the
deviations from the calibrated model of five moments: (i) the fraction of skilled individuals,
(ii) the skill premium, (iii) the unemployment rate of skilled workers, (iv) the unemployment
rate of unskilled workers and (v) the unemployment rate of skilled workers net of that of
unskilled workers. These deviations, for a given moment and counterfactual experiment,
are summarized as the cross-country average of the percentage of that model-generated
moment in the calibration exercise explained by the given counterfactual experiment and
as the squared correlation between that simulated moment in the calibrated model and in
the given counterfactual experiment.13 The results of the first decomposition exercise are
reported in Table 4.14
Match productivities for which at least one of the two parties is skilled are the main driver of
cross-country differences in skill acquisition, accounting for about half of it. With no cross-
country differences in match productivities, the model explains only 54% of cross-country
patterns in the percentage of skilled individuals and, on average, 90% of the fraction of
skilled individuals in a country (Table 4, row 3). Moreover, the correlation between the
fraction of skilled individuals and the logarithm of observed GDP per worker drops from
0.154 in the calibrated model (0.146 in the data) to 0.047 when we keep productivities for
which at least one of the two parties is skilled equal across countries (see Table 5). Higher
productivities for matches where at least a party is skilled increase the returns to acquiring
skill in higher income countries by boosting both wages and firm profits of such matches.
Each match productivity exert a similar role on skill acquisition, with the productivity of a
skill-skill match having a slightly higher effect.15
13The cross-country average of the percentage of a model-generated moment u in the calibrated model
explained by a counterfactual experiment is computed as follows:
1
J
∑J
j=1
{ |xu,j(Λ˜j)/xu,j(Λˆj)| if xu,j(Λ˜j) < xu,j(Λˆj)
|xu,j(Λ˜j)/xu,j(Λˆj)| otherwise
}
, where Λˆj is the vector of calibrated parameters for
country j, Λ˜j is the vector of counterfactual parameters for country j and J is the total number of countries
in the sample.
14The results in Table 4 only consider those countries for which the model consistently solves across all the
counterfactual experiments: there are a total of 13 countries. This sample covers countries with a substantial
variation in output per worker: the poorest country has a per-worker GDP which is 7% the one of the US.
15The disaggregated results for specific match productivities are not reported in Table 4: details are
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% skilled skp u skilled u unskilled u skilled
- unskilled
Average percentage explained of the calibrated model
no c variation 90.0% 64.9% 40.6% 67.2% 54.3%
no sc variation 89.9% 72.8% 60.2% 66.4% 47.2%
no y variation 89.9% 64.7% 59.3% 39.6% 41.4%
Squared correlation with the calibrated model
no c variation 62.1% 7.4% 14.2% 88.1% 76.8%
no sc variation 70.9% 14.3% 60.5% 88.3% 30.5%
no y variation 54.4% 6.7% 67.7% 12.9% 18.2%
Table 4: Decomposition exercise: cross-country analysis. The experiments within the main
decomposition exercise are explained in the main text. % skilled is the fraction of skilled individuals; skp
is the skill premium; u skilled is the unemployment rate of skilled workers, u skilled is the unemployment
rate of unskilled workers, u skilled - unskilled is the unemployment rate of skilled workers net of that of
unskilled workers. Sample of countries: Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Israel, Italy, Netherlands,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Spain, Korea and Uruguay. USA. Source: the World Bank, Ferna´ndez, Guner, and
Knowles (2005) and own computations.
Match productivities are only one facet of the return to acquiring in skill as business cost
determines the probability of skilled workers to acquire this premium by shaping the un-
employment rate of skilled workers. Business costs explain about 1/3 of the cross-country
differences in skill acquisition. With no cross-country differences in the business cost, the
model can account only 62% of cross-country patterns in the fraction of skilled individuals
(Table 4, row 4). This is due to the effect that c has on the unemployment rate of skill
workers. Table 4, row 1 shows that cost of business alone accounts, on average, for 59% of
the unemployment rate of skilled workers in a country and for 63% of the difference in the
unemployment rate between skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, with no cross-country
differences in the business cost, the model can explain only 14% of cross-country patterns
in the unemployment rate of skilled workers compared to 88% of the unemployment rate of
unskilled workers (Table 4, row 4).
Lastly, the direct cost of acquiring skill, the schooling cost sc, exerts the smallest role in
explaining cross-country differences in skill acquisition. With no cross-country differences in
schooling cost, the model accounts for 71% of cross-country patterns in the percentage of
skilled individuals (Table 4, row 5). This is not to say that schooling cost has no impact
available upon request.
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Correlation with % skilled skp u skilled u unskilled u skilled
GDP per worker - unskilled
Data 0.146 -0.772 -0.484 -0.042 -0.329
Model 0.154 -0.772 0.284 0.472 -0.675
with no c variation -0.065 -0.574 0.216 0.455 -0.448
with no sc variation 0.252 -0.437 0.086 0.257 -0.210
with no y variation 0.047 -0.276 -0.117 0.012 -0.130
Table 5: Decomposition exercise: cross-country analysis. The table reports the correlation
between the logarithm of observed GDP per worker and other variables in the data and in the model, under
the calibration and various counterfactual experiments. The experiments within the main decomposition
exercise are explained in the main text. % skilled is the fraction of skilled individuals; skp is the skill
premium; u skilled is the unemployment rate of skilled workers, u skilled is the unemployment rate
of unskilled workers, u skilled - unskilled is the unemployment rate of skilled workers net of that of
unskilled workers. Sample of countries: Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Israel, Italy, Netherlands,
Panama, Peru, Poland, Spain, Korea and Uruguay. USA. Source: the World Bank, Ferna´ndez, Guner, and
Knowles (2005) and own computations.
on the decision of acquiring skill. Notice that the calibrated schooling cost shows lower
cross-country variation than calibrated match productivities and business cost. A series of
studies indeed demonstrate the beneficial effect of abolition of school fees on the schooling
attainment of poor countries (Alderman, Orazem, and Paterno, 2001, Deininger, 2003, Al-
Samarrai and Zaman, 2007 and Schultz, 2004).16
Cross-country patters of the skill premium are mainly driven by match productivities for
which at least one party is skilled and by the business cost, each of them accounting for
about 1/3 of them. Match productivities and business cost account on average, for 35%
of a country’s skill premium. When we don’t allow for cross-country differences in either
of these two parameters, the model explains about 7% of the cross-country pattern in the
skill premium (Table 4, rows 4 and 6). The correlation between the skill premium and the
logarithm of observed GDP per worker increases from -0.772 in the calibrated model (same in
the data) to -0.574 when we keep the business cost equal across countries and to -0.276 when
16We recognize that the set-up of our exercise may lead to an underestimation of the role of schooling cost
for skill acquisition. Indeed, one could argue that the schooling cost influences match productivities when
it affects schooling quality. We show in Appendix A.1 that disparities in match productivities are linked
to disparities in the determinants of individual’s productivity, among which are schooling quantity and the
quality. A non-zero effect of the schooling cost on schooling quality implies that schooling has an additional
indirect effect on skill acquisition via changing match productivities. This additional effect is not captured
in our quantitative exercises as we hold productivities fixed while changing the schooling quality.
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% skilled skp u skilled u unskilled u skilled
- unskilled
Countries in the bottom-half of the income distribution:
Data 65% 2.32 6.96% 6.39% 0.57%
Model 65% 2.32 2.78% 2.73% 0.05%
with cUSA 77% 1.67 0.85% 1.70% -0.85%
with scUSA 60% 2.02 1.97% 2.86% -0.89%
with y·,USA 76% 2.42 4.71% 3.28% 1.42%
Countries in the top-half of the income distribution:
Data 76% 1.42 4.91% 10.17% -5.26%
Model 76% 1.42 1.55% 3.02% -1.47%
with cUSA 77% 1.99 1.24% 3.10% -1.87%
with scUSA 75% 1.99 1.33% 2.56% -1.23%
with y·,USA 85% 1.46 2.21% 3.32% -1.11%
Table 6: Decomposition exercise: poor vs rich countries analysis. The experiments within the
main decomposition exercise are explained in the main text. % skilled is the fraction of skilled individuals;
skp is the skill premium; u skilled is the unemployment rate of skilled workers, u skilled is the unemploy-
ment rate of unskilled workers, u skilled - unskilled is the unemployment rate of skilled workers net of
that of unskilled workers. Sample of countries: 1) Bottom half: Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, South Korea and
Uruguay; 2) Top half: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Israel, Luxembourg, Netherlands
and Sweden. Source: the World Bank, Ferna´ndez, Guner, and Knowles (2005) and own computations.
we keep match productivities for which at least one party is skilled equal across countries
(see Table 5). Notice that, in this case, yss and yus play a significantly more sizable role
compared to yus, and particularly so yss. Cross-country differences in skill-skill productivities
alone account, on average, for 25% of the skill premium in a country.
Overall, match productivities and business cost are the major drivers of the negative cross-
country correlation between skill premium and the fraction of skill workers. This correlation
increases from -0.387 in the calibrated model (-0.367 in the data) to 0.187 with no cross-
country differences in the cost of business and to 0.472 with no cross-country differences in
the match productivities for which at least one party is skilled. On the other hand, the
model still produces a negative cross-country correlation between skill premium and fraction
of skill workers with no cross-country differences in the cost of schooling (-0.133).
Poor vs rich countries analysis. How much gap between poor and rich countries would
be observe with respect to skill acquisition and skill premium if all countries had the same a)
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schooling cost, b) business cost, c) match productivities? Similarly to above, to address this
question we run a decomposition exercise, consisting of three counterfactual experiments. In
each experiment, we assign to each country the US-values of, respectively, the cost of doing
business (“with cUSA”), the schooling cost (“with scUSA”) and the match productivities
for which at least one of the parties is skilled (“with y·,USA”).17 Table 6 reports for the
data, calibrated model and and each of the three counterfactual experiments the implied
averages of: i) the fraction of skilled workers, (ii) the skill premium, (iii) the unemployment
rate of skilled workers, (iv) the unemployment rate of unskilled individuals and (v) the
unemployment rate of skilled workers net of that of unskilled workers for countries in the top-
and bottom-half of the income distribution. Statistics are reported separately for countries
with income in the upper-half of the cross-country distribution of GDP per worker and for
those in the lower-half.18
Business cost and productivities of those matches for which at least one party is skilled are
the main drivers of the gap in skill acquisition between poor and rich countries. Decreasing
the business cost of countries in the bottom-half of the income distribution to US levels would
increase their fraction of skilled individuals of 12 percentage points, closing the gap in skill
acquisition between rich and poor counties entirely (Table 6 row 3). An effect almost equal
in magnitude would happen if countries in the bottom-half of the income distribution were
to obtain match productivities similar to those of the US (Table 6, row 5). Productivity of
those matches where at least one party is skilled influence the decision of investing in skills
directly by increasing its return. Differently, the business cost depresses the unemployment
rate of skilled workers in poor countries of about 2% and the unemployment differential
between skilled and unskilled workers of 1%, turning the latter from positive to negative.
The business cost is also the main driver of the skill-premium gap between rich and poor
countries. Decreasing the business cost of countries in the bottom-half of the income distri-
bution to US levels would decrease their skill premium from 2.32 to 1.67, closing the gap in
skill premium with rich countries by 72% (Table 6, row 3).
Overall, the cost of business is a prime driver of both gaps in the fraction of skilled individuals
and the skill premium. Match productivities have a similar quantitative importance as that
of the cost of business for the gap in the fraction of skill workers. We take these results to
17We pick the US as reference country for this decomposition exercise as this is the richest country in our
sample.
18Table only reports statistics for those countries for which the model consistently solves across all the
alternative experiments within each decomposition exercise.
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indicate the potential role of trends and policies affecting the business cost for a country’s
skill acquisition and skill premium.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the role of business cost for the cross-country patterns of skill
premium and fraction of skilled workers. In a cross section of countries, a 1% increase in
income per worker is associated with an increase of 0.07 percentage points in the fraction of
skilled individuals and with a 0.44 percentage-point decrease in the skill premium. In light
of cross-country evidence of a positive correlation between the unemployment differential
and income per worker, we argue that the cost of business, as a first order determinant of
the unemployment rate, can reconcile a higher skill premium and a lower skill acquisition in
poor countries compared to rich countries.
We develop a simple search model of occupational choice and skill acquisition and use it
to assess the quantitative significance of differences in business cost along with schooling
cost and skill-productivity profile in explaining skill acquisition and skill premium across
countries. We calibrate a higher cost of business for poor than rich countries and find that
disparities in the business cost accounts for about one third of the cross-country correlation
between skill premium and acquisition. Decreasing the business cost to US-levels, while
holding constant other country-specific parameters, would entirely eliminate the gap in the
fraction of skilled individuals between countries in the top-half and bottom-half of the income
distribution in our sample and reduce of 72% the gap in the skill premium. The significant
response of skill investment to changes in the business cost is informative about the potential
role of policies and other trends affecting the business cost.
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A Appendix
A.1 Model Derivations
Risk neutrality case. Under the risk neutrality assumption, the equilibrium distribution
of individuals by skill and occupation is described by the following four probabilities:
psw =
cyss − cysu + scysu
yus(yss − ysu) −
2scyss − yssysu + y2su
2(yss − ysu)(−yss + ysu + yus) ,
puw =
−cyssysu + cy2ss + scyssysu
ysuyus(ysu − yss) +
2c+ 2sc+ ysu
2ysu
+
2scyss − yssysu + y2su
2(yss − ysu)(−yss + ysu + yus) ,
psf =
−2c− 2sc+ ysu
2ysu
+
−2scyss + yssysu − y2su
2ysu(−yss + ysu + yus) ,
puf =
cyss − cysu + scysu
ysuyus
+
2scyss − yssysu + y2su
2ysu(−yss + ysu + yus) .
We report the comparative statics with respect to the cost of schooling:
∂ps
∂sc
=
(ysu + yus)
2
ysuyus(yss − ysu − yus) ,
∂sk
∂sc
|c=0,sc=0 =
4(ysu + yus)(−yss + ysu + yus)(6(ysu + 2yus)y2ss,
−6(y2su + 4yusysu + y2us)yss + (ysu + yus)(y2su + 7yusysu + y2us))
ysuyus(−2yss + ysu + yus)2(ysu + 2yus)2 ,
∂(us − uu)
∂sc
|c=0,sc=0 = −(ysu − yus)(−yss + ysu + yus)(y
2
su + (4yss − yus)yus)
ysuyus(ysu + yus)(ysu + yus − 2yss)2 ,
∂uu
∂sc
|c=0,sc=0 = 2
ysu + yus
− 1
yus
,
∂us
∂sc
|c=0,sc=0 = −(ysu − yus) (4y
2
ss − (3ysu + 5yus) yss + yus (ysu + yus))
ysuyus (−2yss + ysu + yus) 2 .
Origins of match productivities. We show that, in our framework, disparities in match
productivities are linked to disparities in the bias toward skill of the production technology
and to disparities in the determinants of individuals’ productivities.
Assume a firm production technology, y, can be described as:
y(Nsw, Nsf , Nuw, Nuf ) = [(αswhswNsw + αsfhsfNsf )
ρ + (αuwhuwNuw + αufhufNuf )
ρ]
1
ρ ,
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where se (uf) indicates a (un)skilled entrepreneur, and sw (uw) indicates a (un)skilled
worker, N is the number of individuals of a given type and h their average productivity
(or human capital). We can re-formulated this production function as in the skill-biased
technical change literature (see, among others, Heckman, Lochner, and Taber, 1998 and
Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013) and group labour by skill level:
y(Nsw, Nsf , Nuw, Nuf ) =
[(
α¯sh¯sN¯s
)ρ
+
(
α¯uh¯uN¯u
)ρ] 1ρ ,
where α¯x and h¯x are the averages of, respectively, the shares and productivities between
workers and entrepreneurs of a given skill x, i.e. α¯x =
αxw+αxf
2
and h¯x =
hxw+hxf
2
. N¯x is a
human capital aggregator of individuals of a given skill, (see Jones, 2014): N¯x(Nxw, Nxe) =
1
α¯xh¯x
(αxwhxwNxw + αxfhxfNxf ). The bias of the technology toward skill is given by:(
α¯s
α¯u
)ρ
.
When this ratio is greater (lower) than one then the technology has a positive (negative)
bias toward skill.
In our framework a firm employes one worker and one entrepreneur and match productivities
are firms’ output. We can therefore write:
yss = y(1, 1, 0, 0) =
[(
α¯sh¯sN¯s(1, 1)
)ρ] 1ρ ,
ysu = y(1, 0, 0, 1) =
[(
α¯sh¯sN¯s(1, 0)
)ρ
+
(
α¯uh¯uN¯u(0, 1)
)ρ] 1ρ ,
yus = y(0, 1, 1, 0) =
[(
α¯sh¯sN¯s(0, 1)
)ρ
+
(
α¯uh¯uN¯u(1, 0)
)ρ] 1ρ ,
yuu = y(0, 0, 0, 0) ==
[(
α¯uh¯uN¯u(1, 1)
)ρ] 1ρ .
For a set of α¯xxh¯xx products, and therefore a set of α¯xh¯x, we have a set of match productiv-
ities. It is easy to see that, for example, a higher skill bias of the technology would increase
the ratio of yss to yuu. Similarly, a higher productivity of skilled individuals, due for example
to a better quality of schooling, would also increase yss to yuu.
A.2 Tables and Figures
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Correlations between log(GDP per worker) and: value p-value
% of skilled workers 0.511 0.000
skill premium -0.701 0.000
unemployment rate of skilled workers -0.359 0.008
unemployment rate of unskilled workers 0.164 0.240
unemployment rate of skilled workers net of
that of unskilled workers -0.410 0.002
Table 7: Correlations. Skilled individuals are defined to be those with secondary and tertiary education
while unskilled individuals are their complement. For each country, all data except the skill premium are
measured between year 2000 and year 2010 and calculated as average during these years. The skill premium
is measured between year 1992 and year 1998. Source: the World Bank and Ferna´ndez, Guner, and Knowles
(2005).
Correlations between log(GDP per worker) and: value p-value
% of skilled workers 0.482 0.000
skill premium -0.701 0.000
unemployment rate of skilled workers -0.519 0.000
unemployment rate of unskilled workers -0.073 0.604
unemployment rate of skilled workers net of
that of unskilled workers -0.525 0.000
Table 8: Correlations. Skilled individuals are defined to be those with tertiary education while unskilled
individuals are their complement. For each country, all data except the skill premium are measured between
year 2000 and year 2010 and calculated as average during these years. The skill premium is measured
between year 1992 and year 1998. Source: the World Bank and Ferna´ndez, Guner, and Knowles (2005).
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Figure 6: Fraction of skilled individuals and skill premium across countries. For each country,
the fraction of skilled individuals is computed as the ratio of tertiary-educated to primary- and secondary-
educated males. Data are measured between year 2000 and year 2010 and calculated as average during these
years. Source: the World Bank. For each country, the skill premium is computed as the ratio of secondary
and tertiary-educated lifetime earnings relative to primary-educated lifetime earnings. Data are measured
between year 1992 and year 1998. Source: Ferna´ndez, Guner, and Knowles (2005).
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Figure 7: Unemployment rates for skilled and unskilled individuals across countries. Skilled
individuals are defined to be those with tertiary and secondary education while unskilled males are their
complement. For each country, unemployment rate is measured between year 2000 and year 2010 and
calculated as average during these years. Source: the World Bank.
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Figure 8: Fraction of skilled individuals across countries. Skilled individuals are defined to be those
with tertiary education while unskilled individuals are their complement. For each country, the fraction of
skilled individuals is computed as the ratio of secondary- and tertiary-educated to primary-educated males.
Data are measured between year 2000 and year 2010 and calculated as average during these years. Source:
the World Bank.
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Figure 9: Unemployment rates for skilled and unskilled individuals across countries. Skilled
individuals are defined to be those with secondary and tertiary education while unskilled males are their
complement. For each country, unemployment rate is measured between year 2000 and year 2010 and
calculated as average during these years. Source: the World Bank.
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Figure 10: Cost of schooling in the US. Foregone earnings: sum of high school graduates mean earnings
between ages 19 and 22. Tuition and fees for public college reflect in-state charges. Data are normalized to
tuition and fees in public colleges for the 1920 cohort. Source: IPUMS-USA, Snyder and Dillow (2011) table
345, and Conrad and Hollis (1955).
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